Per Unit and Ad Valorem Royalties in a Patent Licensing Game

Marta Montinaro, Rupayan Pal and Marcella Scrimitore

No 307305, FACTS: Firms And Cities Towards Sustainability from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) > FACTS: Firms And Cities Towards Sustainability

Abstract: In a context of product innovation, we study two-part tariff licensing between a patentee and a potential rival which compete in a differentiated product market characterized by network externalities. The latter are shown to crucially affect the relative profitability of Cournot vs. Bertrand when a per unit royalty is applied. By contrast, we find that Cournot yields higher profits than Bertrand under ad valorem royalties, regardless of the strength of network effects.

Keywords: Production; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2020-11-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ipr and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/307305/files/NDL2020-014.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Per Unit and Ad Valorem Royalties in a Patent Licensing Game (2020)
Working Paper: Per unit and ad valorem royalties in a patent licensing game (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemff:307305

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.307305

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