Warm-Glow Giving in Networks with Multiple Public Goods

Lionel Richefort

No 259480, ETA: Economic Theory and Applications from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper explores a voluntary contribution game in the presence of warm-glow effects. There are many public goods and each public good benefits a different group of players. The structure of the game induces a bipartite network structure, where players are listed on one side and the public good groups they form are listed on the other side. The main result of the paper shows the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash equilibrium is also shown to be locally asymptotically stable. Then the paper provides some comparative statics analysis regarding pure redistribution, taxation and subsidies. It appears that small redistributions of wealth may sometimes be neutral, but generally, the effects of redistributive policies depend on how public good groups are related in the contribution network structure.

Keywords: Research; Methods/; Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2017-07-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-soc and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/259480/files/NDL2017-032.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods (2018)
Working Paper: Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods (2018)
Working Paper: Warm-Glow Giving in Networks with Multiple Public Goods (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemth:259480

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.259480

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