A Variational Approach to Network Games

Emerson Melo

No 268732, ETA: Economic Theory and Applications from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper studies strategic interaction in networks. We focus on games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and departing from previous literature, we do not assume particular functional forms on players' payoffs. By exploiting variational methods, we show that the uniqueness, the comparative statics, and the approximation of a Nash equilibrium are determined by a precise relationship between the lowest eigenvalue of the network, a measure of players' payoff concavity, and a parameter capturing the strength of the strategic interaction among players. We apply our framework to the study of aggregative network games, games of mixed interactions, and Bayesian network games.

Keywords: Research; Methods/Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 2018-02-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemth:268732

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268732

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