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The Political Consequences of Green Policies: Evidence from Italy

Italo Colantone, Livio Di Lonardo, Yotan Margalit and Marco Percoco

No 327326, FEEM Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: For many governments, enacting green policies is a priority, but such policies often impose on citizens substantial and uneven costs. How does the introduction of green policies a˙ect voting? We study this question in the context of a major ban on polluting cars introduced in Milan, which was strongly opposed by the populist right party Lega. Using several inferential strategies, we show that owners of banned vehicles — who incurred a median loss of €3,750 — were significantly more likely to vote for Lega in the subsequent elections. Our analysis indicates that this electoral change did not stem from a broader shift against environmentalism, but rather from disaffection with the policy’s uneven pocketbook implications. In line with this pattern, recipients of compensation from the local government were not more likely to switch to Lega. The findings highlight the central importance of distributive consequences in shaping the political ramifications of green policies.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69
Date: 2022-10-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemwp:327326

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.327326

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