Competition, Regulation and Privatisation of Electricity Generation in Developing Countries: Does the Sequencing of the Reforms Matter?
Yingang Zhang,
David Parker and
Colin Kirkpatrick
No 30599, Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers from University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM)
Abstract:
Recent years have seen countries introducing reform of their utility industries with a view to promoting private ownership and competition. This paper studies the effect of the sequencing of privatisation, competition and regulation reforms in electricity generation using data from 25 developing countries for the period 1985 to 2001. A fixed effects panel data model is used. The study finds that establishing an independent regulatory authority and introducing competition before privatisation is correlated with higher electricity generation, higher generation capacity and, in the case of the sequence of competition before privatisation, improved capital utilisation.
Keywords: Resource; /Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:idpmcr:30599
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30599
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