A RISK PROGRAMMING APPROACH TO DESIGNING CONTRACTS TO REDUCE NITRATE LEACHING

Mei-Chin Chu, Scott Swinton and Sandra S. Batie

No 11594, Staff Paper Series from Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics

Abstract: As contractual agriculture expands, contract design offers a non-regulatory opportunity to reduce non-point source pollution. A risk programming analysis of seed corn contract designs illustrates a tractable empirical principal-agent model, and shows that grower risk preferences affect contract acceptability and efficiency at reducing nitrate leaching.

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/11594/files/23417.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:midasp:11594

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.11594

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff Paper Series from Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().