Content Requirements with Bilateral Monopoly

John Beghin () and Daniel Sumner

No 259453, Department of Economics and Business - Archive from North Carolina State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper models physical content policies in a bilateral monopoly setting, using a cooperative game approach. For just binding or nonbinding content requirements, the policy does not induce any dead-weight lossbut alters the profit distribution in favor of the domestic supplier. This result holds as long as the inputs concerned by the policy are good substitutes in production, and when the disagreement point corresponds to low content requirements and low marginal cost for the domestic input.

Keywords: Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 1990-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ncbuar:259453

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.259453

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