The New Protectionism Revisited
Richard G. Harris
No 275219, Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper reviews the strategic trade literature in oligopolistic industries beginning with the Brander-Spencer (1984) model of duopolistic international rent-shifting. Issues of long run equilibrium, entry conditions, and empirical estimates of the size of oligopolistic rents in tradeable goods industries are reviewed. In addition the results of simulation models of strategic trade policy are summarized. The final sections of the paper deal with issues of the retaliation by other countries against single country policies and long term policy equilibrium. It is emphasized that the Prisoners' dilemma characterization of these equilibrium may in inappropriate, and managed trade may be a more plausible outcome in oligopolistic industries than strategic trade policies.
Keywords: Financial Economics; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56
Date: 1989-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275219/files/QUEENS-IER-PAPER-758.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:queddp:275219
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275219
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search (aesearch@umn.edu).