Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets

Richard J. Sexton

No 25183, Research Reports from University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center

Abstract: This paper is a survey on noncooperative game theory relevant to agricultural markets. It is divided into two parts. Part I discussed types of noncooperative games and reviews important developments in noncooperative game theory solution concepts, including Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Strengths and weaknesses of game theory as a modelling tool are also assessed. Part II illustrates applications of the theory to agricultural markets. Game theory is relevant when markets are imperfectly competitive, and this paper argues that this condition is commonly met in agriculture. Specific topics of application include principal-agent models, vertical control, auctions, and bargaining. A shortened version of this paper was published in the Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics.

Keywords: Industrial Organization; Marketing; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 1993
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uconnr:25183

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25183

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