The Bobolink Project: Selling Public Goods from Ecosystem Services Using Provision Point Mechanisms

Stephen Swallow, Christopher M. Anderson and Emi Uchida

No 148351, Working Paper series from University of Connecticut, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy

Abstract: We report a two-year field experiment that solicited residents of Jamestown, Rhode Island, USA, to contribute funds to support contracts with farmers willing to provide a portfolio of public goods associated with improving the nesting success of grassland birds, particularly the Bobolink. A direct-mail marketing experiment collected funds through four provision point, money-back guarantee mechanisms: a voluntary contribution mechanism with a proportional rebate; a pivotal mechanism based on the Clarke tax; and two novel uniform price auction mechanisms. Valuation estimates recovered from the voluntary contribution mechanism approached that of the pivotal mechanism, with one uniform price auction falling lower.

Keywords: Public Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2012-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucozwp:148351

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.148351

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