TRANSFERS TO AGRICULTURE: LINKS TO LOBBYING

Fidele Ndayisenga and Jean D. Kinsey

No 14435, Working Papers from University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to systematically incorporate lobbying in a microeconomic model of the profit maximizing farmer, derive testable implications of the model and apply it to establish the link, or lack thereof, between policy benefits transferred to farmers and their lobbying expenditures. Policy transfers will be measured by the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), a comprehensive annual dollar measure of transfers to producers that results from government intervention in agriculture (Josling and Tangerman, 1988).

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14435/files/wp95-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:umciwp:14435

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.14435

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().