CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL I: COMPETITION

Amitrajeet Batabyal

No 28351, Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers from Utah State University, Economics Department

Abstract: I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies. Forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economics

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control I: Competition (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:usuesp:28351

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28351

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