Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare
Jean Hindriks and
Ben Lockwood
No 269623, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper studies the relationship between ¯scal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analyzing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selection e®ects, and thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economies of scale, so that absent elections, voters are indi®erent about the ¯scal regime. The e®ect of ¯scal centralization on voter welfare works through two channels: (i) via its e®ect on the probability of pooling by the bad incumbent; (ii) conditional on the probability of pooling, the extent to which, with centralization, the incumbent can divert rents in some regions without this being detected by voters in other regions (selective rent diversion). Both these e®ects depend on the information structure; whether voters only observe ¯scal policy in their own region, in all regions, or an intermediate case with a uniform tax across all regions. More voter information does not necessarily raise voter welfare, and under some conditions, voter would choose uniform over di®erentiated taxes ex ante to constrain selective rent diversion.
Keywords: Financial Economics; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2005-03-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269623/files/twerp_729.pdf (application/pdf)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269623/files/twerp_729.pdf?subformat=pdfa (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare (2009) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
Working Paper: Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare (2005) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
Working Paper: Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare (2005) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
Working Paper: Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare (2005) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
Working Paper: Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Vote Welfare (2005) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
Working Paper: Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare (2005) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
Working Paper: Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare (2005) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269623
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269623
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search (aesearch@umn.edu).