Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations
Eric Weese
No 148748, Center Discussion Papers from Yale University, Economic Growth Center
Abstract:
Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.
Keywords: Political Economy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58
Date: 2013-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations (2015)
Working Paper: Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (2013)
Working Paper: Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:yaleeg:148748
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.148748
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