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Network Games under Strategic Complementarities

Mohamed Belhaj (mbelhaj@centrale-marseille.fr), Yann Bramoullé and Frédéric Deroïan (frederic.deroian@univ-amu.fr)

No 1225, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken.

Keywords: Network Games; Strategic Complementarities; Supermodular Games; Bonacich Centrality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Network games under strategic complementarities (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Network games under strategic complementarities (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Network Games under Strategic Complementarities (2012) Downloads
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