Environmental Policies under Debt Constraint

Mouez Fodha, Thomas Seegmuller and Hiroaki Yamagami

No 1431, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: This article analyzes the consequences of environmental tax policies when the government imposes a constraint on stabilizing public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by taxation and by issuing public debt. Considering a simple overlapping-generations model, the tax reform stimulates steady-state investment. Then, the environmental quality and the aggregate consumption increase if and only if (i) pollution abatement is large enough and (ii) there is under-accumulation of the per capita capital stock. This arises if environmental taxation allows a decrease of either income taxation or debt-output ratio.

Keywords: environmental tax reform; debt; public emission abatement; double dividend (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 H63 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2014-06, Revised 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ene, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/file ... nder-debt-constraint (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Environmental Policies under Debt Constraint (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1431

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France AMU-AMSE - 5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498 - 13205 Marseille Cedex 1. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gregory Cornu ().