What Motivates French Pork: Political Career Concerns or Private Connections?

Brice Fabre () and Marc Sangnier
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Brice Fabre: Paris School of Economics, Institut des Politiques Publiques

No 1705, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: This paper uses the detailed curricula of French ministers and the detailed accounts of French municipalities to identify governmental investment grants targeted to specific jurisdictions. We distinguish between municipalities in which a politician held office before being appointed as a government’s member and those in which current ministers lived during their childhood. We provide evidence that municipalities in which a minister held office during her career experience a 45% increase in the amount of discretionary investment subsidies they receive during the time the politician they are linked to serves as minister. In contrast, we do not find any evidence that subsidies flow to municipalities from which ministers originate. Additional evidence advocate in favour of a key role of network and knowledge accumulated through connections, illustrated by a persistence of the impact of intergovernmental ties.

Keywords: pork-barrel economics; distributive politics; political connections; private connections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H50 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: What Motivates French Pork: Political Career Concerns or Private Connections? (2017)
Working Paper: What Motivates French Pork: Political Career Concerns or Private Connections? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1705

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