Condorcet Jury Theorem and Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments

Yukio Koriyama and Ali Ozkes

No 1708, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: An information aggregation problem of the Condorcet Jury Theorem is considered with cognitive hierarchy models in which players would best respond holding heterogeneous beliefs on cognitive level of the other players. Whether the players are aware of the presence of opponents at their own cognitive level turns out to be a key factor for asymptotic properties of the deviation from the Nash behavior, and thence for asymptotic efficiency of the group decision. Our laboratory experiments provide evidence for the self-awareness condition. We obtain an analytical result showing that the difference from the standard cognitive hierarchy models arises when the best-reply functions are asymptotically expanding.

Keywords: collective decision-making; bounded rationality; cognitive hierarchy; Condorcet Jury Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/files/_dt/2012/wp_2017_-_nr_08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Inclusive Cognitive Hierarchy (2020)
Working Paper: Inclusive Cognitive Hierarchy in Collective Decisions (2018)
Working Paper: Inclusive Cognitive Hierarchy in Collective Decisions (2018)
Working Paper: Condorcet Jury Theorem and Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1708

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France AMU-AMSE - 5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498 - 13205 Marseille Cedex 1. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gregory Cornu ().