Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform

Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz

No 1820, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: On many two-sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade.

Keywords: network effects; two-sided markets; platform competition; intermediation; pricing; Imperfect Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ict, nep-ind, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Managing competition on a two‐sided platform (2019)
Working Paper: Managing competition on a two-sided platform (2019)
Working Paper: Managing competition on a two-sided platform (2019)
Working Paper: Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform (2018)
Working Paper: Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1820

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