A Theory of Elite-Biased Democracies

Raouf Boucekkine (), Rodolphe Desbordes () and Paolo Melindi-Ghidi
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Rodolphe Desbordes: SKEMA Business School-UCA, https://knowledge.skema-bs.fr/author/rodolphedesbordes/

No 2039, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: Elite-biased democracies are those democracies in which former political incumbents and their allies coordinate to impose part of the autocratic institutional rules in the new political regime. We document that this type of democratic transition is much more prevalent than the emergence of pure (popular) democracies in which the majority decides the new political rules. We then develop a theoretical model explaining how an elitebiased democracy may arise in an initially autocratic country. To this end, we extend the benchmark political transition model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) along two essential directions. First, population is split into majority versus minority groups under the initial autocratic regime. Second, the minority is an insider as it benefits from a more favourable redistribution by the autocrat. We derive conditions under which elite-biased democracies emerge and characterise them, in particular with respect to pure democracies.

Keywords: elite-biased democracy; institutional change; minority/majority; economicfavouritism; Inequality; revolution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: A theory of elite-biased democracies (2021)
Working Paper: A theory of elite-biased democracies (2021)
Working Paper: A Theory of Elite-Biased Democracies (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2039

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