Trade barriers in government procurement

Alen Mulabdic and Lorenzo Rotunno

No 2122, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: This paper estimates trade barriers in government procurement, a market that accounts for 12% of world GDP. Using data from inter-country input-output tables in a gravity model, we find that home bias in government procurement is significantly higher than in trade between firms. However, this difference has been shrinking over time. Results also show that trade agreements with provisions on government procurement increase cross-border flows of services, whereas the effect on goods is small and not different from that in private markets. Provisions containing transparency and procedural requirements drive the liberalizing effect of trade agreements.

Keywords: government procurement; trade agreements; gravity equation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 F15 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trade barriers in government procurement (2022)
Working Paper: Trade barriers in government procurement (2022)
Working Paper: Trade barriers in government procurement (2021)
Working Paper: Trade barriers in government procurement (2021)
Working Paper: Trade Barriers in Government Procurement (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2122

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