The tragedy of the (anti-)commons: The case of prey-predator fisheries

Guillaume Bataille (), Hubert Stahn () and Agnes Tomini ()
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Guillaume Bataille: Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France, https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/members/bataille
Hubert Stahn: Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France, https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/members/stahn
Agnes Tomini: Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France, https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/members/tomini

No 2305, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: We examine the efficiency and environmental consequences of assigning species-specific common-property rights, considering a Lotka-Volterra model in which fisheries are specialized in the harvesting of a single species. We show that the fragmentation of the ecosystem implies the tragedy of the anticommons even when fisheries compete for the resource. Indeed, contrasting the private exploitation equilibrium with the socially optimal solution, we demonstrate that the predator stock is too high while the prey stock is too low under private property rights. A puzzling result is that the "abundant" species is actually underused because of insufficient economic incentives; however, the scarce and high-priced species does not necessarily suffer from overexploitation. Biological interactions are consequently the main driver of stock depletion. Finally, we investigate how to simultaneously solve both the tragedy of the commons and that of the anticommons and analyze the economic costs of regulating only the tragedy of the commons.

Keywords: exclusive property rights; common-pool resource; anticommons; fisheries; prey-predator relationship; optimal control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C73 H23 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2305

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