Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities

Brice Fabre () and Marc Sangnier
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Brice Fabre: aParis School of Economics (PSE) and Institut des Politiques Publiques (IPP), https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/equipes/brice-fabre/

No 2434, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: This paper uses French data to simultaneously estimate the impact of two types of connections on government subsidies allocated to municipalities. Investigating different types of connection in a same setting helps to distinguish between the different motivations that could drive pork-barreling. We differentiate between municipalities where ministers held office before their appointment to the government and those where they lived as children. Exploiting ministers’ entries into and exits from the government, we show that municipalities where a minister was mayor receive 30% more investment subsidies when the politician they are linked to joins the government, and a similar size decrease when the minister departs. In contrast, we do not observe these outcomes for municipalities where ministers lived as children. These findings indicate that altruism towards childhood friends and family does not fuel pork-barreling, and suggest that altruism toward adulthood social relations or career concerns matter. We also present complementary evidence suggesting that observed pork-barreling is the result of soft influence of ministers, rather than of their formal control over the administration they lead.

Keywords: Local favouritism; distributive politics; Political Connections; personal connections. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H50 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/fil ... /wp_2024_-_nr_34.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities (2025)
Working Paper: Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities * (2024)
Working Paper: Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities (2024)
Working Paper: Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities (2024)
Working Paper: Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities (2024)
Working Paper: Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities (2024)
Working Paper: Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities * (2024)
Working Paper: Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2434

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