Norms as Obligations

Leonard Hoeft (), Michael Kurschilgen, Wladislaw Mill and Simone Vannuccini
Additional contact information
Leonard Hoeft: Humboldt University to Berlin
Simone Vannuccini: Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex

Munich Papers in Political Economy from Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich

Abstract: Economists model legal compliance as the process of maximizing utility while weighing the consequences from norm violation against other (monetary and non-monetary) considerations. Legal philosophers, on the other hand, believe that norms provide exclusionary reasons, i.e. that people apply the norm precisely to make a choice without weighing up on other issues. We test and compare both models in a controlled online experiment. We conduct a modified dictator game with partially unknown yet ascertainable payoffs, and vary between treatments the presence and content of authoritative norms. Our experimental results show that – in the presence of a norm – participants follow norms without searching for information that they deem important in the absence of a norm. This pattern is independent of the specific content of the norm. Our results are consistent with the legal model of norm compliance.

Keywords: Norms; Information; Authority; Willful Ignorance; Dictator Game; Legal Theory; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D81 D83 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2022-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-law and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Norms as obligations (2025)
Working Paper: Norms as Obligations (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aiw:wpaper:22

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