Resolving Conflicts and Strengthening International Relations with Investment: Game Theory Approach
Salah Salimian and
Azadeh Ashrafi
Journal of Applied Economic Research, 2024, vol. 23, issue 1, 59-81
Abstract:
Today, investors pay more attention to the international concept of investment than ever before. In addition, countries intend to use their domestic capital to fulfill domestic goals and prevent capital outflow as much as possible. The present article, while referring to objective examples of international relations, has tried to provide a different answer to the important question of "economic cooperation in the form of international investment while maximizing" by using game theory. The main question is whether investment at the international level can avoid war and build? For this purpose, by using game theory and game design between governments and investors as the main openers, three different modes have been discussed. To this end, in section one a state where two countries are indifferent has been considered. The second state includes two competing (enemy) countries, and in the third state, three countries are assumed, one being competitor and the other indifferent. In the second section, first a situation where two countries are indifferent to each other is considered. Then, in the second case, two countries are considered to be rivals (enemies), and in the third case, three countries are assumed: one of them is a competitor and the other is indifferent. Concerning the obtained equilibrium in the three states and for each of the two sections, the main conclusion is that the investor achieves the best consequence (Nash equilibrium) by constituting portfolio and investing in various markets, and the countries achieve the best outcome through cooperation and establishing peace. On the other words, the results of the research in the language of logic (mathematics) confirm the effect of economic cooperation on the development of peace.
Keywords: peace; game theory; static games with complete information; Nash equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 D50 F52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aiy:jnjaer:v:23:y:2024:i:1:p:59-81
DOI: 10.15826/vestnik.2024.23.1.003
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