Competitive gerrymandering and the popular vote
Felix Bierbrauer () and
Mattias K Polborn
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Felix Bierbrauer: University of Cologne
No 34, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany
Abstract:
Gerrymandering undermines representative democracy by creating many uncompetitive legislative districts, and generating the very real possibility that a party that wins a clear majority of the popular vote does not win a majority of districts. We present a new approach to the determination of electoral districts, taking a design perspective. Specifically, we develop a redistricting game between two parties who both seek an advantage in upcoming elections, and show that we can achieve two desirable properties: First, the overall election outcome corresponds to the popular vote. Second, most districts are competitive.
Keywords: Gerrymandering; Popular Vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_034_2020.pdf First version, 2020 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote (2020) 
Working Paper: Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:034
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