Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home

Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski and Nicolas Werquin
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Felix Bierbrauer: University of Cologne
Nicolas Werquin: Toulouse School of Economics

No 71, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized.

Keywords: Political competition; Income Taxation; Turnout (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 109 pages
Date: 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:071

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