Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities

Johannes Münster () and Markus Reisinger ()
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Johannes Münster: Department of Economics, University of Cologne
Markus Reisinger: Department of Economics, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

No 96, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: In bilateral negotiations between a principal and two agents, we show that the agents' bargaining strengths are crucial for the determination of the bargaining sequence and the efficiency of decisions. In a general framework with externalities between agents, we find that the surplus is highest if the principal negotiates with the stronger agent first, regardless of externalities being positive or negative. The principal chooses the efficient sequence with negative externalities, but often prefers the inefficient sequence with positive externalities. We show that our results extend to a general number of agents and provide conditions for simultaneous negotiations to be optimal.

Keywords: bargaining power; sequential negotiations; externalities; bilateral contracting; endogenous timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D62 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 86 pages
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_096_2021.pdf First version, 2021 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:096

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