Carrots and Sticks: Targeting the Opposition in an Autocratic Regime
Cathrin Mohr ()
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Cathrin Mohr: University of Bonn, Niebuhrstr. 5, 53113 Bonn, Germany
No 236, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany
Abstract:
Autocratic regimes can use carrots and/or sticks to prevent being overthrown by protests. Carrots, i.e. resource allocation, reduce the probability of protests, but cannot help to end them. Sticks, i.e. repression, reduce the probability that protests overthrow the regime, but also decrease its popularity. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that residential construction and military presence increase in protest municipalities after an uprising in 1953 in former East Germany. This cannot be explained by pre-existing differences, demand for housing, or external warfare considerations. Carrots were furthermore used to counteract sticks' negative effect on popularity. More construction is associated with more regime support.
Keywords: Political Economy; autocracy; Protests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 N44 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_236_2023.pdf First version, 2023 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:236
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