Informal Elections with Dispersed Information: Protests, Petitions, and Nonbinding Voting

Mehmet Ekmekci () and Stephan Lauermann ()
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Mehmet Ekmekci: Boston College, Department of Economics
Stephan Lauermann: University of Bonn, Department of Economics

No 289, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: We study information transmission through informal elections. Our leading example is that of protests in which there may be positive costs or benefits of participation. The aggregate turnout provides information to a policy maker. However, the presence of activists adds noise to the turnout. The interplay between noise and participation costs leads to strategic substitution and complementarity effects in citizens’ participation choices, and we characterize the implications for the informativeness of protests. In particular, we show that rather than being a friction, costs may facilitate information transmission by lending credibility to protest participation.

Keywords: Political; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:289

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