The Myth of Central Bank Independence

Thomas Cargill
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Thomas Cargill: Mercury Publication

No 6813, Working Papers from George Mason University, Mercatus Center

Abstract: The Federal Reserve frequently emphasizes its independence from government, stresses the importance of independence as the foundation for accountability to the “dual mandate,†and frequently invokes an “independence defense†when confronted with any propo

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Date: 2016-10-31
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