Tech Platforms and Market Power: What’s the Optimal Policy Response?

Thomas Lambert
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Thomas Lambert: Mercury Publication

No 11271, Working Papers from George Mason University, Mercatus Center

Abstract: Specific Questions: What are the relative merits of antitrust versus direct regulation for addressing market power concerns on digital platforms.

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Date: 2021-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-pay and nep-reg
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