Race to collusion: Monitoring and incentive contracts for loan officers under multiple-bank lending

Kanishka Dam () and Prabal Roy Chowdhury
Additional contact information
Kanishka Dam: Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE)
Prabal Roy Chowdhury: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: The possibility of vertical collusion between an informationally opaque borrower and corruptible loan officers, to whom the task of monitoring is delegated, in bank-loan officer-borrower hierarchies shapes the incentive contracts for the loan officers. Collusive threats exacerbate incentives for overmonitoring, and make monitoring efforts of the banks strategic complements because of a novel ‘race-to-collusion’ effect—a hitherto unexplored effect of multiple-bank lending. Thus, delegation contract solves the free-riding problem in the presence of monitoring duplication, and may lead to higher levels of per-bank monitoring in multiple-bank lending. Moreover, over-monitoring, albeit inefficient relative to the optimal contract in the absence of race-to-collusion, may enhance social welfare. We further show that the collusion-proofness principle may fail to hold under multiple-bank lending.

Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.isid.ac.in/~epu/dispapers/dp20_05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:alo:isipdp:20-05

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Debasis Mishra ().