Symmetric reduced form voting

Debasis Mishra () and Xu Lang ()
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Debasis Mishra: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Xu Lang: Southwest University of Finance and Economics
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Joydeep Bhattacharya

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a unanimous voting rule. A consequence of our results is that if the prior is indepenent, every symmetric and orinally Bayesian incentive compatible voting rule is reduced (interim) form equivalent to a symmetric and strategy-proof voting rule.

Keywords: reduced form voting; unanimous voting; ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:alo:isipdp:22-03

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