The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Enforcement

Robert Feinberg and Kara Reynolds

No 2009-17, Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics

Abstract: While there has been a considerable literature exploring determinants of antitrust enforcement in the United States, studies have been based either on aggregate federal enforcement data over time (exploring cyclical influences) or cross-industry studies, usually for a single year or aggregated over several years. What has never been investigated is the pattern of state-level antitrust. This is somewhat surprising, as this has been a major activity of many state Attorneys General. In this paper, we explain state antitrust enforcement across states and time (for a 15-year period), examining a number of economic and political determinants which have been proposed in the literature.

Keywords: antitrust; enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-pol and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://doi.org/10.17606/pcf8-r716 First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-17

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