How Do Countries Respond to Antidumping Filings? Dispute Settlement and Retaliatory Antidumping

Robert Feinberg and Kara Reynolds

No 2016-04, Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the antidumping petitions filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory antidumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding. Using a panel of global antidumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyze under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an antidumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed retaliatory antidumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary. JEL classification: F13

Keywords: WTO Dispute Settlement; Antidumping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger and nep-int
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https://doi.org/10.17606/hk0b-kt54 First version, 2016 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: How Do Countries Respond to Antidumping Filings? Dispute Settlement and Retaliatory Antidumping (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:amu:wpaper:2016-04

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