Electoral rules and public expenditure composition: Evidence from Italian regions

Raffaella Santolini

No 396, Working Papers from Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali

Abstract: The paper investigates the effects produced by the electoral system on expenditure composition by exploring the case of Italian regions over the period 1986-2009. Empirical analysis shows that the regional current expenditure transfers distributed to families and firms significantly decrease when the regional electoral system moves from being proportional to mixed. Particularly striking is the reduction in pre-electoral years under the regional mixed-regime. Although not robust across different empirical specifications, an increase in the regional expenditure on local public goods is found when the regional electoral system becomes mixed.

Keywords: local institutional design; panel data analysis; public expenditure composition; regional government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H30 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eur and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anc:wpaper:396

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