Corruption in Developing Countries

Benjamin Olken and Rohini Pande

Annual Review of Economics, 2012, vol. 4, issue 1, 479-509

Abstract: Recent years have seen a remarkable expansion in economists' ability to measure corruption. This in turn has led to a new generation of well-identified, microeconomic studies. We review the evidence on corruption in developing countries in light of these recent advances, focusing on three questions: how much corruption is there, what are the efficiency consequences of corruption, and what determines the level of corruption? We find robust evidence that corruption responds to standard economic incentive theory but also that the effects of anticorruption policies often attenuate as officials find alternate strategies to pursue rents.

Keywords: corruption; development; graft; bribes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K42 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (300)

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Working Paper: Corruption in Developing Countries (2011)
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