Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

Sigrid Suetens and Jan Potters

Working Papers from University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets.

Keywords: Collusion; Quantity-choice and price-choice experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bertrand colludes more than Cournot (2007)
Working Paper: Bertrand colludes more than Cournot (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ant:wpaper:2005037

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