Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: An experimental analysis

Geert Dhaene and Jan Bouckaert

Working Papers from University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma (SPD) and a mini-ultimatum game (MUG). Data on subjects’ behavior and firstand second-order beliefs allow us to classify their behavior as a material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none. In both games, about 80% of the first-movers’ behavior is a material best response, a reciprocity best response, or both. The remaining 20% of first-movers almost always make choices that are “too kind” according to the theory of reciprocity. Second-movers’ behavior, in both games, is fully in line with the predictions of the theory. Average behavior and beliefs, across subjects, are found to be compatible with a sequential reciprocity equilibrium in the SPD, but not in the MUG. We also found first- and second-order beliefs to be unbiased in the SPD, and nearly unbiased in the MUG, with the exception that first-movers in the MUG significantly overestimated the second-mover’s rejection rate of unequal offers.

Keywords: Sequential reciprocity; Sequential prisoner’s dilemma; Mini-ultimatum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C70 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: An experimental analysis (2010)
Working Paper: Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stages games: an experimental analysis (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ant:wpaper:2007026

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