Stable Decompositions of Coalition Formation Games

Agustín Bonifacio, Elena Inarra and Pablo Neme

No 110, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: It is known that a coalition formation game may not have a stable coalition structure. In this study we propose a new solution concept for these games, which we call “stable decomposition”, and show that each game has at least one. This solution consists of a collection of coalitions organized in sets that “protect” each other in a stable way. When sets of this collection are singletons, the stable decomposition can be identified with a stable coalition structure. As an application, we study convergence to stability in coalition formation games.

Keywords: Coalition formation; matching; absorbing sets; stable decompositions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:110

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