Core and Stability Notions in Many-to-one Matching Markets with Indifferences

Agustín Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

No 138, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: In a many-to-one matching model with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the strong core coincides with the strongly stable set, and (iii) the super core coincides with the super stable set. We also show how the core and the strong core in markets with indifferences relate to the stable matchings of their associated tie-breaking strict markets.

Keywords: Matching with indifferences; Stability; Strong Stability; Super Stability; Core; Strong Core; Super Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/138.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences (2024)
Working Paper: Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:138

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