Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustín Bonifacio and Marcelo Ariel Fernandez

No 166, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We study the implications of regret-free truth-telling for voting rules. Regretfreeness, a weakening of strategy-proofness, provides incentives to report preferences truthfully if agents want to avoid regret. We first show that for tops-only rules regret-freeness is equivalent to strategy-proofness. Then, we focus on three families of (non-tops-only) voting methods: maxmin, scoring, and Condorcet consistent ones. We show positive and negative results for both neutral and anonymous versions of maxmin and scoring rules. We also show that Condorcet consistent rules that satisfy a mild monotonicity requirement are not regret-free, and neither are successive elimination rules. Furthermore, we provide full characterizations for the case of three alternatives and two agents.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Regret-freeness; Voting Rules; Social Choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/166.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Regret-free truth-telling voting rules (2025)
Working Paper: Regret-free truth-telling voting rules (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:166

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Inés D Amato ().