Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies

Manuel Foerster and Daniel Habermacher

No 229, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We investigate competition between experts with different motives. A policy-maker has to implement a policy and can either acquire information herself or hire a biased but well-informed expert. We show that the expertcharges a fee if interests between the agents are roughly aligned, and pays contributions in order to get the decision delegated—and thus acts as a lobbyist instead of as an advisor—if the conflict of interest is substantial and the policy is important to her. We then introduce an unbiased careerconcerned expert and show that lobbying may occur because of competition. Finally, the effect of competition on societal welfare may be negative if policy is (not) important to society but the unbiased expert provides bad (good) advice.

Keywords: Policy advice; private information; delegation; lobbying; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/229.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:229

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Inés D Amato ().