Nash Implementation in a many-to-one Matching Market

Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero and Jorge Oviedo

No 255, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: In a many-to-one matching market with substitutable preferences, we analyze the game induced by a stable rule. When both sides of the market play strategically, we show that any stable rule implements, in Nash equilibrium, the individually rational matchings. Also, when only workers play strategically and firms’ preferences satisfy the law of aggregated demand, we show that any stable rule implements, in Nash equilibrium, the stable matchings

Keywords: Stable matchings; Nash equilibrium; substitutable preferences; matching game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/255.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market (2024)
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