Juries and Information Aggregation in Dynamic Environments

Esteban Colla-De-Robertis

No 272, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We study information aggregation through voting in dynamic environments. We show that the voting rule under which an informative vote is a Nash equilibrium entails a time-varying quota, which suggests that efficient information aggregation requires the use of time-varying voting rules. We also show that a time-invariant simple majority quota rule is asymptotically efficient, that is when the size of the committee tends to infinity. We discuss possible applications to the monitoring and managing of natural resources and the environment.

Keywords: Condorcet; Jury; Theorem; -; Information; aggregation; -; Partially; Observable; Markov; Decision; Processes; -; Management; of; natural; resources; -; Environment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:272

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