Tilting the playing field. Do Double Simultaneous Voting System and Apparentment Lists contribute to subnational party hegemony?

José Bercoff, Osvaldo Meloni and Juan Tabuenca ()

No 302, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: This paper contributes to the political competition literature by providing empirical evidence of the influence of Double Simultaneous Voting System (DSVS) and Apparentment Lists (AL), in force in several Argentine districts since 1987, on party hegemony and the concentration of the party system. Results from a panel data of 9 gubernatorial elections and all 24 argentine subnational jurisdictions show that these electoral systems favor the persistence of the incumbent party in office, diminish the effective number of parties, and improve the probability of victory of the incumbent party. DSVS and AL generate a profusion of subgroups that take advantage of preexisting party fragmentation, clientelistic networks and large vertical fiscal imbalance

Keywords: Political competition; electoral systems; subnational politics; Double simultaneous voting system; Apparentment lists. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:302

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