Assessment of collusion damages in first price auctions

Maria Gabrielli and Manuel Willington

No 5, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We propose a structural method for estimating the revenue losses associated with bidding rings in symmetric and asymmetric first-price auctions. It is based on the structural analysis of auction data and is consistent with antitrust damage assessment methodologies: we build a but-for (competitive) scenario and estimate the differences between the two scenarios. We show in a Monte Carlo exercise that our methodology performs very well in moderate size samples. We apply it to Ohio Milk Data Set analyzed by Porter and Zona [1999] and find that damages are around 7%. Damages can be assessed without any information about unaffectedmarkets.

Keywords: Collusion; First; price; auctions; Damages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C1 C4 C7 D44 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des and nep-ecm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:5

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