Financial Risk Capacity

Saki Bigio

No 22, Working Papers from Peruvian Economic Association

Abstract: Financial crises seem particularly severe and lengthy when banks fail to recapitalize after large losses. I explain this failure and the consequent depth of financial crises through a model in which banks provide intermediation in markets with informational asymmetries. Large equity losses reduce a bank's capacity to bear further losses. Losing this capacity leads to reductions in intermediation and exacerbates adverse selection. Adverse selection, in turn, lowers profits from intermediation, which explains the failure to attract equity injections or retain earnings quickly. Financial crises are infrequent events characterized by low economic growth that is overcome only as banks slowly recover by retaining earnings. I explore several policy interventions.

Keywords: Financial Crisis; Adverse Selection; Capacity Constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-cba
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Financial Risk Capacity (2021)
Working Paper: Financial Risk Capacity (2019)
Working Paper: Financial Risk Capacity (2019)
Working Paper: Financial Risk Capacity (2012)
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