Payment and Policy Consequentiality in Contingent Valuation
Peter Groothuis,
Tanga M. Mohr,
John Whitehead and
Kristan Cockerill
No 15-04, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University
Abstract:
In stated preference survey research, policy consequentiality exists when the respondent believes that the results of a survey will influence actual policy. Payment consequentiality exists when respondents perceive that there is some non-zero probability that they will have to pay the bid amount. In this study we test for both types of consequentiality using a survey about water conservation measures in western North Carolina. Our analysis finds that both policy and payment consequentiality exist in responses to willingness-to-pay for water conservation measures. Respondents who self-report that they perceive the survey to be consequential are willing to pay positive amounts for the policy. Respondents who do not perceive the survey to be consequential answer with protest no responses and are not responsive to the tax amount in the referendum voting question. In addition as the tax amount increases respondents are less likely to find the survey to be consequential. Understanding the boundaries of consequentiality can contribute to improved survey design to estimate public willingness-to-pay for and acceptance of water conservation programs. Key Words:
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-env
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:apl:wpaper:15-04
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